Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.: Supreme Court Leaves Extraterritorial Antitrust Questions Unanswered by Tong, Geoffrey T.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-1988
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.: Supreme Court Leaves Extraterritorial
Antitrust Questions Unanswered
Geoffrey T. Tong
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Geoffrey T. Tong, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.: Supreme Court Leaves Extraterritorial Antitrust Questions
Unanswered, 10 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 401 (1988).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol10/iss2/4
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp.: Supreme Court Leaves
Extraterritorial Antitrust Questions
Unanswered
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of World War II, the importance of international
trade in the United States marketplace has grown dramatically. The
transformation of the United States economy, however, has been far
from painless. The popularity of foreign products has produced a rec-
ord balance of trade deficits' as imported goods began to dominate
certain markets. 2 In 1986, the United States became the world's larg-
est debtor nation, owing foreign interests nearly $200 billion more
than that owed to United States creditors. 3 Only three years earlier
the United States had been the largest creditor nation.4
This tremendous growth of foreign trade has brought with it a
commensurate increase in antitrust litigation involving both foreign
companies and transactions. The extraterritorial application of
United States antitrust law, however, has evolved very slowly during
this period despite the increasing interdependence of the United States
and the world economy. Moreover, the federal circuit courts have
followed different approaches. Since the original codification of
United States antitrust law in 1890, Congress amended the statute
very slightly. 5 Consequently, United States courts have, without gui-
dance from Congress, struggled to apply United States antitrust laws
to foreign corporations and agreements.
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,6 the
1. The United States balance of trade deficit was estimated to reach a record $160 billion
to $170 billion in 1986. The Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
2. For example, in 1985 imported products comprised: 63% of radio and television sets,
58% of shoes, 45% of machine tools, 40% of semiconductors, 18% of computers, and 20% of
motor vehicles sold in the United States. The Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1986, at 16, cols. 2-3.
3. Id. at 16, col. 1.
4. Id.
5. The original targets of United States antitrust laws were domestic companies and
trusts. Consequently, the antitrust laws vaguely addressed the issue of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion. While Congress has codified some extraterritorial provisions, it has generally deferred
most antitrust issues, both substantive and jurisdictional, to the courts.
6. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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United States Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to twenty-one Japanese consumer electronics
manufacturers alleged to have illegally conspired over a twenty year
period to eliminate competitors from the United States by an agree-
ment to maintain artificially low prices in the United States market.
7
The plaintiffs contended that the losses incurred in the United States
were offset by an agreement to charge higher than normally competi-
tive prices in Japan.8
The Supreme Court's opinion, however, failed to address two im-
portant issues. First, although the Court granted a writ of certiorari
on the issue, the Court did not address the parameters of the sover-
eign compulsion defense. 9 Additionally, the Court, in its brief discus-
sion of the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws,
raised doubt over the jurisdictional "rule of reason" 10 approach devel-
oped by the federal courts over the past decade.
This Note primarily focuses on the Supreme Court's discussion
of the "rule of reason" approach, the vitality of the sovereign compul-
sion defense and the potential impact of this defense on foreign anti-
trust policy. Additionally, this Note briefly discusses the Court's
raising of the "threshold" requirement to obtain antitrust summary
judgment." I
Establishing the scope of United States antitrust jurisdiction may
ultimately require Congressional legislation. However, until Congress
acts, it is important to the actors in the global economy, domestic and
foreign corporations, and governments that the courts enunciate a
clear standard. This Note concludes that the Supreme Court incor-
rectly ignored the extraterritorial issue. Moreover, by not fully ad-
dressing this issue, the Supreme Court added to the confusion
surrounding the application of United States antitrust law.
7. Id. at 577-78.
8. Id.
9. Briefly, the sovereign compulsion defense provides a defendant relief from conduct
required by another foreign government. See infra text accompanying notes 284-321.
10. This approach was first developed in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549
F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
11. The Court required that the plaintiffs, suing under sections 1-2 of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, must provide sufficient evidence which tends to exclude the possibility that the al-
leged conspirators acted independently. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 588-90 (1986). Additionally the plaintiffs must present a claim that is factually
"plausible" (i.e., must make economic sense). Id. at 593.
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II. FACTS OF THE CASE
A. Background
In the United States, Japanese companies dominate the con-
sumer electronics products (CEP) 12 marketplace. Fierce competition
among companies in Japan created an innovative environment for
product development. For example, a Japanese consumer entering a
department store is overwhelmed by the products of more than 580
manufacturers producing over 200 types of stereo headphones, 100
different models of color television sets and 75 types of record turnta-
bles. 13 This wealth of diverse products, combined with intense do-
mestic competition, greatly contributed to the success of the Japanese
in the United States CEP marketplace. However, this success has
caused tremendous economic dislocation among United States com-
petitors.14 Over the past two decades, from 1952 to the late 1970's,
the collective Japanese share of United States CEP market rose from
twenty percent to almost fifty percent. '5 By 1986, United States man-
ufacturers sold only thirty-seven percent of the televisions and radios
sold in the United States.16
During this period, United States government agency reports,' 7
academic reports,' 8 internal company memorandum,' 9 minutes of
12. Consumer electronics products (CEP) generally refers to monochrome (black and
white) and color television receivers in co-plaintiff National Union Electric's (NUE) antitrust
suit. For the purposes of this Note, CEP encompasses the broader definition used by co-
plaintiff Zenith Radio Corporation, which also includes radios, phonographs, tape and audio
equipment, and electronic components. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1119 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
13. TIME, Aug. 1, 1983, at 38, col. 1.
14. National Union Electric Company, one of the primary plaintiffs in Zenith, is a prime
example. NUE initially stopped production and resold television sets under their brand name,
but later completely abandoned the television market after sustaining heavy losses. Zenith,
513 F. Supp. at 1119.
15. See supra note 2.
16. The Wall St. J., supra note 2, at 16.
17. A 1968 report by the United States Commissioner of Customs stated that "[tihe in-
formation received tends to indicate that the prices of the television sets for exportation to the
United States are less than the prices for such or similar merchandise for home consumption in
Japan." In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
In 1970, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury concluded that television sets from Japan
were sold at less than "fair value." Id. at 267.
A United States Tariff Commission report concluded that "imports of television receivers
from Japan, sold at LTFV [less than fair value] . . .have caused substantial loss of sales by
United States producers." Id. at 270.
18. Included were studies by Professors Kozo Yamamura (Univ. of Washington), Gary
R. Saxonhouse (Univ. of Michigan), and John 0. Haley (Univ. of Washington School of Law).
Also relied on by the courts were studies by Dr. Horace J. DePodwin (Horace J. DePodwin
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trade group meetings, 20 and employee diaries of Japanese manufactur-
ers21 indicated improprieties in the export of CEPs from Japan. The
various reports documented agreements in Japan to allocate exports,
markets and technology among the subscribing companies.
B. Procedural History of the Case
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.22 the
competition between Japanese and United States CEP companies left
the marketplace and entered the courtroom. In 1974,23 in the United
States District Court for Pennsylvania, Zenith Radio Corporation
(Zenith) and National Union Electric Corporation (NUE) 24 filed suit
Associates) and Stanley Nehmer (Economic Consulting Services, Inc.), both economic consult-
ing firms. Id. at 276.
Briefly, the reports found, inter alia, that Japanese manufacturers (including the defend-
ants here): engaged in price discrimination to sell televisions in the United States below cost
while earning substantial profits in Japan; had a total production capacity far exceeding the
needs of the Japanese market; had higher fixed costs than similar United States firms, which
created an environment in which vigorous price competition was unlikely and made collusion
desirable; and further found that Japanese government imposed trade barriers allowed manu-
facturer-controlled distribution and retail price controls in Japan. Id. at 281-84.
19. For example, a Toshiba memorandum summarized the meetings of the inter-manu-
facturer "Palace Group," and discussed issues concerning electrical appliance producers. The
memo described a proposal by Matsushita to raise the color television profit margin in Japan
from 18% to 20% which was agreed to by all in attendance. Id. at 294.
20. For example, see the minutes of the Electronic Industries Association of Japan, TV
Export Council Meetings and notice of the meeting of the Market Stabilization Council. Id. at
296, 298. Portions of the documents were authored by employees of defendant Matsushita.
Id. at 297.
The Market Stabilization Council was created pursuant to an order by the Japanese Min-
istry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to implement government foreign trade poli-
cies. The meeting established "'MITI-mandated minimum prices below which television
receivers could not be sold in the Japanese domestic market for export to the United States.' "
Id. at 298 (quoting interrogatory given by an employee of Mitsubishi Electric Co.) The court
of appeals found that the meeting was held for the purpose of acting in concert. Id. at 299.
21. Included were the diaries and memorandum of Mssrs. Yajima, Yamada, Yamamoto,
Okuma and Tokizane. Id. at 285. The diaries and memorandum discuss meetings of the
"Tenth Day" and "TS" groups, regularly attended by employees of the defendant companies,
which the plaintiffs alleged were used to engage in price fixing. Id. at 289. The evidentiary
value of the diaries and memorandum was contested by the defendants, because many entries
contained hearsay. See FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
22. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa.
1981), rev'd, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
23. NUE first filed suit against the Japanese defendants in December, 1970. Zenith filed
a similar suit in 1974. The Pennsylvania district court consolidated the pretrial proceedings.
"The transfer was made unconditional and the actions were consolidated for trial." Zenith,
513 F. Supp. at 1119.
24. Formerly the Emerson Radio Company. Emerson Radio manufactured and sold tel-
evision receivers until 1970. After sustaining substantial losses, NUE sold television sets man-
1988] Extraterritorial Antitrust Questions
against twenty-four companies and alleged that "the Japanese defend-
ants and others had conspired to take over the American (CEP) in-
dustry and thereby drive NUE [and Zenith] out of business."' 2 Of the
principal defendants,26 seven were manufacturers of CEPs, 27 one was
a Japanese trading company,28 and two were United States compa-
nies. 29 Fourteen defendants were subsidiaries of the principal Japa-
nese defendants. 30  Additionally, the plaintiffs' complaint named
numerous other co-conspirators whose business operations ranged
from small Japanese companies to large multi-national corporations. 3
l
Plaintiffs Zenith and NUE alleged, inter alia,32 that the defend-
ants violated sections one and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act 33 by
attempting and conspiring to monopolize the United States CEP mar-
ket by " 'commonly and systematically,' with predatory intent, selling
their products in this country for substantially less than their actual
market value in Japan ' 34 and "by discriminating in price among
American purchasers.
'35
Zenith and NUE claimed that the defendants agreed to artifi-
cially raise their prices in Japan which resulted in lower sales in
ufactured by other companies under the "Emerson" name until completely abandoning the
market in 1972. Id.
25. Id.
26. The defendants which manufactured and sold CEPs, both United States and Japa-
nese, were controlled by Japanese parent corporations, or sold Japanese manufactured prod-
ucts. Id. at 1119-20.
27. The seven manufacturers were: Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.; Toshiba Corp.; Hitachi,
Ltd.; Sharp Corp.; Sanyo Elec. Co., Ltd.; Sony Corp.; and Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. Id. at 1119.
28. Mitsubishi Corporation. Id.
29. Sears, Roebuck & Co. and Motorola, Inc. Id.
30. Id.
31. For example, named as defendants were industrial giants N.V. Philips Gloei-
lampenfabrieken (German) and General Electric Company. Id. at 1120.
32. Zenith and NUE also alleged that the Japanese manufacturers violated the An-
tidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982), section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982), and section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1120 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982). Section 1 states: "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... " Id. § 1.
Section 2 states: "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade of
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of felony
.... Id. §2.
34. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1120 (E.D.
Pa. 1981).
35. Id.
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defendents' country.36 Consequently, according to the plaintiffs, the
Japanese CEP manufacturers were forced to export more goods to the
United States than they would have if their products were fairly
priced. 37 Zenith and NUE also alleged that the Japanese manufactur-
ers' "five-company rule" required each manufacturer to sell their
products to only five specified wholesale distributors.38 The plaintiffs
claimed that the five-company rule restricted competition among the
defendants and caused the plaintiffs to lose more business than
usual.39
The litigation consumed an extraordinary amount of resources of
the parties and the trial court. Discovery alone lasted several years
and produced a tremendous volume of evidence.4° For example, the
plaintiffs' Final Pre-trial Statement was 17,000 pages long and raised
hundreds of issues.41 One-hundred-and-fourteen briefs or memo-
randa were filed during the first nine months of 1980 alone.
42
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
A. The United States District Court Decision
The Pennsylvania district court, in an opinion over two-hundred
pages long, initially focused on the admissibility of the plaintiffs' evi-
dence.43 The court held that the vast majority of the evidence submit-
36. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 307 (3d Cir. 1983).
37. Id. at 305.
38. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 581, 602-03 nn.2 &
3 (1986).
39. Id.
40. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 255.
41. In order to limit the issues and the evidence presented, the district court's pre-trial
order mandated that "[e]xcept for good cause shown, the parties are precluded from offering at
trial any facts or evidence supporting such facts which have not been disclosed in the [Final
Pre-trial Statement]." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889,
949-50 (E.D. Pa. 1979). The court's pre-trial order also "require[d] that each party make,
before trial, with preclusive effect, a complete offer of proof on each issue it intended to prove."
Pre-Trial Order No. 154, Zenith, 478 F. Supp. at 950.
42. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1118 n.2. The unusually large number of documents filed
required the court to order the creation of a document depository in the courthouse. The Final
Pretrial Statement before the district court included an evidentiary record of 250,000 docu-
ments submitted by the parties. Pretrial Order No. 219, In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d
238, 255 (3d Cir. 1983).
43. See generally Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1135-38, 1265-1317. Basically, five categories of
evidence were presented by the plaintiffs. Briefly, the five categories of evidence presented
were:
(1) Reports prepared by the United States Treasury Department under the 1921
Antidumping Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160-71;
(2) Findings of fact by the United States International Trade Commission under
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ted and relied upon by Zenith and NUE was hearsay and inadmissible
under any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.44 The trial court de-
termined that the inadmissible evidence lacked the inherent trustwor-
thiness required for admission to the court record. 45
The inadmissible evidence was "not considered in opposition to
the defendants' summary judgment46 motion. '47  The court, after
evaluating the remaining evidence, sustained the motion for summary
judgment by the Japanese manufacturing companies. 48  The court
held that the admissible evidence raised no triable issue of fact re-
garding the alleged conspiracy to raise and maintain artificially high
prices in Japan while keeping prices low for products exported to the
United States. 49 According to the trial court, the plaintiffs failed to
prove that the defendants had acted in concert, a requirement for all
conspiracy claims. 50 Thus, the district court granted summary judg-
ment.5 ' The court also granted summary judgment against Zenith
and NUE's claim that the defendants violated section 2 of the Sher-
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat.
1978 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 & 19 U.S.C.), and its successor
statute, the Trade Act of 1974, Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76
Stat. 872 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.);
(3) Records and findings of fact by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission;
(4) Conclusions expressed by experts in five academic studies;
(5) Diaries and reports of employees who attended intercompany meetings between
competitors in the Japanese marketplace.
In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 263-97.
44. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1331. Because most of the evidence relied upon by Zenith
and NUE was hearsay, the court was forced to examine the Federal Rules of Evidence hearsay
exceptions for (1) public records and reports [Rule 803(8)(c)]; (2) testimony by experts [Rule
702); (3) records of regularly conducted activity [Rule 803(6)]; (4) former testimony [Rule
804(b)(1)]; (5) statement against interest [Rule 804(b)(3)]; (6) admission by party opponent
[Rule 801(d)(2)]; (7) residual exception for material fact [Rule 803(24) and 804(5); and
(8) present sense impression [Rule 803(1)]. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 259-303.
45. Id. at 264.
46. The defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure Rule 56(c): "[tlhe judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if... there is no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
47. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 255-56 (3d Cir. 1983).
48. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1180-1318
(E.D. Pa. 1981).
49. Id. at 1318-21.
50. Id. at 1321.
51. Id. The district court also granted summary judgment to Zenith's claim of price
discrimination between Japan and the United States, and between U.S. customers, violating
the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 1323-29. The court held that the plaintiffs produced insuffi-
cient evidence to demonstrate that the defendants' alleged conspiracy to charge different prices
in Japan and United States injured their companies or competition. Id. Finally, the court
granted summary judgment against Zenith's alleged violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act
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man Act because the aggregate-share theory required proof of con-
certed action. 52  Zenith and NUE alleged that the defendants
conspired to use their aggregate or combined market share to monop-
olize the United States market. 53 The court concluded that the plain-
tiffs did not produce sufficient evidence to preclude the possibility that
the defendants merely acted independently according to their eco-
nomic interests. 54
Zenith and NUE subsequently appealed the district court's grant
of summary judgment and its evidentiary rulings.
B. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed most of the district
court's evidentiary rulings after determining that the trial court erred
in excluding much of the plaintiffs' evidence.55 Judge Gibbons held
that the evidence possessed sufficient trustworthiness and should have
been considered by the trial court prior to granting the motion for
summary judgment.
56
Consequently, the appellate court, after evaluating the newly en-
larged evidentiary record, reversed the lower court's grant of the de-
fendants' motion for summary judgment. The court held that "there
is both direct evidence of certain kinds of concert of action and cir-
cumstantial evidence having some tendency to suggest that other
kinds of concert of action may have occurred."' 57 The court con-
cluded that a reasonable fact finder could find a conspiracy to de-
crease prices in the United States market to eliminate United States
competitors, which was funded by excess profits obtained from sales
in Japan. 58
The court of appeals found:
because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any injury traceable to the transaction. Id. at 1329-
31.
The court also denied Zenith's objection to the sale of Quasar by Motorola to Mitsubishi
Electric, Inc., and Sanyo's purchase of a seventy-five percent interest. Id.
52. Id. at 1175-76.
53. Id. at 1124-25.
54. Id. at 1318-23.
55. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 260-303 (3d Cir. 1983).
56. The appellate court's contrary finding resulted from its application of a less stringent
standard of hearsay evidence. Generally, the admissibility of hearsay evidence is subject to the
judge's discretion pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 60 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
57. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 304-05.
58. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 581 (1986).
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(1) Oligopolistic behavior characterized the Japanese market
for consumer electronics. A small number of manufacturers met
regularly to exchange information, including pricing. This envi-
ronment created the opportunity to raise both prices and profits in
Japan.
59
Additionally, significant trade barriers erected by the Japanese
government effectively barred foreign consumer electronics compa-
nies from the Japanese domestic market. 6°
(2) The Japanese manufacturers had relatively higher fixed
costs compared to United States producers. Consequently, the
Japanese companies, in order to make a profit, needed to operate at
nearly production capacity.
61
(3) The collective manufacturing capability of the Japanese
CEP companies exceeded the consumption requirements of the do-
mestic market.
62
(4) The Japanese CEP manufacturers formally agreed to
minimum prices for products exported to the United States. The
"check price agreements" were arranged in cooperation with Ja-
pan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). 6
3
(5) Manufacturers in Japan also agreed to distribute their
products in the United States to only five distributors. This agree-
ment became known as the "five-company rule." 64
(6) Despite the check price agreements, the Japanese manu-
facturers bypassed the agreement by using variety of rebate
schemes. The companies attempted to conceal their rebate
schemes from both the United States Customs Service and MITI to
avoid customs regulations, punitive action under anti-dumping
laws and action by the Japanese government. 65
Consequently, based upon these findings, the court of appeals
concluded that "a fact-finder might reasonably infer that the alloca-
tion of customers in the United States, combined with price-fixing in
Japan, was intended to permit concentration of the effects of dumping
upon American competitors while eliminating competitors among the
Japanese manufacturers in either market."
'66
59. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 307-11.
60. Id. at 307.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 310.
64. Id. at 311.
65. Id.
66. Id. Judge Gibbons also concluded that "[t]he collusive establishment of dumping
19881
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C. Supreme Court Grant of Writ of Certiorari
The United States Supreme Court granted the defendants' writ of
certiorari, 67 but limited its review of the Third Circuit's judgment to
(1) whether the standard the district court applied in granting the
defendants' motion for summary judgment was correct and
(2) whether the defendants are liable under United States antitrust
laws for a conspiracy partly compelled by a foreign sovereign. 68 The
Supreme Court did not review the court of appeal's reversal of the
district court's evidentiary rulings.
69
D. The United States Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority
A divided Supreme Court 70 reversed the Third Circuit's judg-
ment, holding that "[tlhe Court of Appeals did not apply proper stan-
dards in evaluating the District Court's decision to grant petitioners
motion for summary judgment. ' 71 The majority believed that no gen-
uine issue of fact 72 existed because (1) the plaintiffs suffered no cogni-
zable injury;73 (2) the plaintiffs' direct evidence had little if any,
relevance to the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy; and (3) no plau-
sible explanation existed for the defendant manufacturers to engage in
predatory pricing.
74
Associate Justice Powell, 75 writing for the majority, initially dis-
tinguished plaintiffs Zenith and NUE's case from prior antitrust liti-
gation before the Court. The Court refused to recognize Zenith and
NUE's claim "based solely on alleged cartelization of the Japanese
market, because American antitrust laws do not regulate the competi-
prices could support an inference of collective predatory intention to harm American competi-
tors." Id.
67. 471 U.S. 1002 (1985).
68. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 311 (3d Cir. 1983).
69. The Court gave no explanation why the evidentiary rulings were not examined. Tra-
ditionally, evidentiary rulings are within the discretion of the trial court and thus are not
reviewed absent abuse of discretion. See MCCORMICK, supra note 56, § 60.
70. The Court voted five to four to reverse and the case was remanded.
71. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); see DeLuca v. Atlantic Refining Co., 176 F.2d 421, 423
(1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 943 (1950); and First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391
U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968).
73. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596-97.
74. Id. at 593.
75. Justice Powell was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger, Justices Marshall,
Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
576 (1986).
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tive conditions of other nations' economies[ ]" unless the conduct has
an effect on United States commerce. 76 The Court then addressed the
summary judgment standard applied by the lower courts.
a. the plaintiffs Zenith and NUE suffered no cognizable injury
The Supreme Court found that Zenith and NUE suffered no cog-
nizable antitrust injury.77 According to the majority, the non-price
distribution restraints78 alleged by the plaintiffs neither caused prices
to rise nor limited production. 79 The Court acknowledged that such
agreements may harm competition, but in the instant case, the out-
come actually benefited competitors by allowing supra-competitive
8 0
pricing.8' Thus, the majority believed that Zenith and NUE actually
profited from any agreement to raise market prices or limit product
distribution because of the reduced marketplace competition. Conse-
quently, because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate cognizable injury,
Zenith and NUE must prove injury resulting from a predatory pricing
conspiracy in the United States consumer electronics marketplace.
8 2
b. the plaintiffs Zenith and NUE failed to prove a predatory
pricing conspiracy existed
The Third Circuit held that respondents Zenith and NUE's alle-
gation of a horizontal conspiracy to predatorily price CEPs would be
a per se 83 violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.84 The Supreme
Court majority, however, believed that the plaintiffs failed to present
sufficient evidence to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspira-
tors acted independently. 5 Consequently, the majority found no rele-
76. Id. at 582.
77. Id. at 586.
78. For example, the alleged "five-company rule."
79. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 583.
80. A supra-competitive price is a price higher than what the marketplace would bear.
Supra-competitive pricing becomes viable if the supply fails to meet demand for a product;
here this allegedly occurred because of the defendants' agreement to limit distribution.
81. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596-97 (1986).
82. Id. at 584-86 & n.7.
83. Under a per se analysis, the court may invalidate agreements which clearly result in
restraining competition, regardless of any benefits which may arise from the activity.
84. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584-85.
The defendants did not appeal this conclusion of the court of appeals and thus, "It]he
issue... becomes whether respondents adduced sufficient evidence in support of their theory
to survive summary judgment." Id.
85. Id. at 592-93.
1988]
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vant direct evidence that raised a genuine issue of fact for trial.8 6
Justice Powell, strictly limited the scope of permissible infer-
ences, and thus found no evidence that the conspiracy was reasonable
considering "competing inferences of independent action or collusive
action .. ,,s8 The majority believed that economic factors strongly
suggested that the defendants had no motive to form the antitrust
conspiracy. Additionally, because the conduct of the Japanese manu-
facturers may equally be explained as competition as well as an illegal
conspiracy, the conduct standing alone does not support an inference
of antitrust conspiracy.88 Consequently, because the plaintiffs' claim
was inconsistent with "economic sense," Zenith and NUE must pro-
vide more persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to
support their claim.89 The Court, therefore, found the plaintiffs' evi-
dence to be insufficient.
c. the defendants lacked plausible motive to engage in conspiracy
to predatorily price
The Supreme Court applied its "economic sense" 90 standard
against plaintiffs Zenith and NUE's claims of a predatory pricing con-
spiracy. Predatory pricing allegations are inherently speculative be-
cause the conspirators must voluntarily forego profits offered by
unrestrained competition.9' The conspirators must sustain short-run
losses in expectation of later realizing uncertain monopoly profits.92
After completing the conspiracy's objectives, the company must have
obtained sufficient market power to recover its lost earnings by mo-
nopoly pricing.
93
Additionally, plaintiffs Zenith and NUE alleged a conspiracy in-
volving twenty-one corporate defendants. 94 However, a conspiracy
86. Id. at 598. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), evaluating a summary judg-
ment motion requires the judge to "pierce the pleadings and assess the proof in order to see
whether there is a genuine need for trial." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (advisory comm.'s note to
1963 amendment).
87. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 587.
90. Conduct of the defendants must be supported by a logical business motive: for exam-
ple, sustaining short-term to later reap long-term increased profitability. Conversely, incurring
unrecoverable losses to obtain a monopoly fails to meet the Court's economic sense
requirement.
91. Id. at 588-89.
92. Id.
93. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
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involving numerous firms, over a long period,95 is "incalculably more
difficult to execute than an analogous plan undertaken by a single
predator. ' 96 The increased difficulty arises because the losses sus-
tained and any gains realized must be allocated among the partici-
pants in the conspiracy. 97
Consequently, the Supreme Court required direct evidence of
predatory pricing by the defendants because "only direct evidence of
below cost pricing is sufficient to overcome the strong inference that
rational businesses would not enter into conspiracies." 98 Neither the
district court nor the court of appeals, however, found that the de-
fendants' market share conveyed sufficient economic power to charge
monopoly prices. 99 The Court concluded that the absence of a plausi-
ble motive to engage in a pricing conspiracy is "highly relevant" to
determine the existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial.10° Conse-
quently, if the defendants lacked a "rational economic motive to con-
spire [and their conduct is consistent] with other, equally plausible
explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of
conspiracy."10 1
The Court, however, found little evidence to prove a plausible
motive. Plaintiffs Zenith and NUE failed to provide sufficient admis-
sible, direct evidence of a conspiracy to monopolize the United States
consumer electronics market. Thus, the majority sustained that dis-
trict court's grant of the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Justice Powell expressed a strong concern to protect corporations
from damage arising from allegations which require an inference of a
conspiracy. By requiring direct evidence of a conspiracy, the court
sought to minimize the potential of an erroneous conclusion inferred
from competitive conduct. For example, a price reduction in order to
increase business, is a fundamental characteristic of the free market
system. The majority cautioned that "mistaken inferences [of a con-
spiracy] . . are costly, because they chill the very conduct the anti-
trust laws are designed to protect."'' 0 2
95. Plaintiff Zenith alleged that the conspiracy began in 1953, while NUE contended the
defendants' illegal conduct began in 1960. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 591 n.13.
96. Id. at 590.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 595-96.
99. Id. at 593.
100. Id. at 596-97.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 594.
1988]
414 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 10:401
d. remand by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals10 3 to consider if other evidence existed which per-
mitted a trier of fact to find that the defendants conspired to price
predatorily despite no apparent motive to do so.' °4 The majority also
required that the evidence must tend to exclude the possibility that
the defendants reduced prices to legally compete for business. Justice
Powell ordered that, absent such a showing, the defendants are enti-
tled to the reinstatement of summary judgment. 0 5
e. extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act
The Supreme Court briefly addressed the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The majority limited its discus-
sions of the issue to a single footnote. 106 The Court relied on United
States v. Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa)10 7 and held that the
Sherman Act's jurisdiction was limited to activity which had an effect
on United States commerce. 10 8  The Court did not fully address this
issue despite plaintiffs Zenith and NUE allegation that the "effect"
here was artificially depressed CEP prices in the United States.1°9
The many countries" 0 which submitted amici curiae briefs on
the sovereign defense issue reflected the importance of the sovereign
defense issue to international trade. The defendants claimed their
agreements were immune from antitrust laws because these agree-
103. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, upon remand by the Supreme Court, reconsid-
ered the entire case. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 807 F.2d 44, 46 (3d Cir.
1986). In a narrowly written opinion, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were foreclosed
from arguing both the existence of a motive to enter into the alleged conspiracy and "that the
direct and circumstantial evidence to which this court referred in its prior opinion is sufficient
to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 47. Additionally, no other evidence
raised material issues of fact to regarding alleged predatory pricing conspiracy by the defend-
ants. Id. at 48. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment on behalf of each defendant. Id. at 49.
Plaintiffs Zenith and NUE subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certio-
rari. The Court, however, denied the plaintiffs request, thus ending over a decade of litigation.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 107 S. Ct. 1955 (1987).
104. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597-98 (1986).
105. Id. at 598.
106. See id. at 582 n.6.
107. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
108. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 582 & n.6.
109. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n.6 (1986).
110. Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom submitted a joint brief as ami-
cus curiae; the United States also submitted a brief as amicus curiae.
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ments were compelled by the Japanese government."'I The Supreme
Court, " 2 however, did not reach the issue. The majority found that if
a conspiracy to charge higher than competitive prices existed, Zenith
and NUE could not have suffered a cognizable injury because the
plaintiffs would actually benefit from such an agreement.' 13
2. The Dissent
Associate Justice White,' 14 writing for the dissent, stated it was
"remarkable that the Court, in the face of the long and careful opin-
ion of the Court of Appeals, reaches the result it does."" 5 The dissent
found no reversible error and argued that the plaintiffs' evidence
raised genuine issues of material fact." 6 According to Justice White,
the majority "only muddies the waters [by] mak[ing] confusing and
inconsistent statements about the appropriate standard for granting
summary judgment."" 
7
Although the Court "faithfully followed the relevant precedents
,",8 the dissent believed that the majority opinion departed from
the traditional standard for summary judgment." 9 The dissent as-
serted that the language of the majority suggests that the judge should
go beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for
herself whether the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff. 20 Jus-
tice White stated that if the Court majority is overturning "settled"
law, this pronouncement should have been clearly stated to avoid
111. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 315 (3d Cir. 1983).
The defendants contended the "check price" agreements were compelled by MITI. MITI
informed the district court that it had required the check price agreements. Id.
112. The dissent also did not reach the sovereign compulsion issue: "[s]ince the Court does
not reach this issue, I see no need of my addressing it." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 605 n.5 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 596. Reduced competition in the CEP market would also allow the plaintiffs to
profit from supra-competitive pricing.
114. Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens joined Justice White in his dissent. Id. at
598.
115. Id. Justice White believed that "the evidence taken as a whole creates a genuine issue
of fact .." and that "the Court of Appeals' opinion more than adequately supports this
judgment." Id. at 599.
116. Id. at 603.
117. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 599 (1986).
118. The dissent cited as examples: First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.
253 (1968); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); and Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). Id. at 598.
119. Id. at 599.
120. Id. at 600-01. Traditional summary judgment doctrine requires that "all evidence be
construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Id. at 601.
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"unnecessarily broad and confusing language."1 2'
The majority opinion followed economic-analysis theory in dis-
counting the plaintiffs' evidence, especially the DePodwin Report.
22
Justice White believed that the report alone created a genuine issue of
fact that Zenith and NUE were harmed by actions of the defend-
ants. 23 Consequently, the dissent would have held that the plaintiffs
suffered a cognizable injury from the artificially depressed prices
caused by products sold in the United States.
2 4
Justice White agreed with the Third Circuit's opinion which
found "that this case is distinguishable from traditional 'conscious
parallelism ' 25 cases, in that there is direct evidence of concert of ac-
tion among petitioners."'' 26 The dissent noted that, although illegal
121. Id. at 601. The dissent believed the majority raised the standard for summary judg-
ment under the Sherman Act without expressly stating so. Justice White wanted the majority,
if indeed changing the standard for summary judgment, to clearly enunciate the new standard.
Id.
122. The report analyzed television manufacturing in Japan and the United States, includ-
ing statistics on: Japanese television industry concentration, construction and export data, fa-
cilities expansion, and production investment and capacity. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723
F.2d 238, 279 (3d Cir. 1983). The experts concluded that conditions and opportunities were
conducive to collusion. Most importantly, the report concluded that the Japanese companies
acted in concert consistent with the plaintiffs' conspiracy theory. Id. at 280.
The trial court described the DePodwin Report as "by far the most careful, scholarly, and
disinterested of the reports submitted by the plaintiffs' expert witnesses." Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. at 1100, 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
123. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 603 (1986) (White,
J., dissenting); see id. at 601-03.
124. Id. at 601-03.
[T]he price-raising scheme in Japan resulted in lower consumption of petitioners'
goods in that country and the exporting of more of petitioners' goods to this country
than would have occurred had prices in Japan been at the competitive level. Increas-
ing exports to this country resulted in depressed prices here, which harmed
respondents.
Id. at 601-02. The plaintiffs were also injured by the Japanese manufacturers' five company-
rule, under which each company agreed to sell their products to only five specified wholesale
distributors. As a result, Zenith and NUE lost business (other than that lost through the
normal course of business) because of the restricted intragroup competition. Id. at 602-03 nn.2
& 3 (citing the DePodwin Report submitted in the Brief for Appellants at 1629a-30a, 1628a-
29a).
125. Although parties acting with "conscious parallelism" pattern their actions after each
other, they do not act in concert with the intent to restrain commerce. See, e.g., Tose v. First
Pennsylvania Bank, 648 F.2d 879, 890-91 (3d Cir. 1981); Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 207-09 (3d Cir. 1980).
Conscious parallel conduct by itself, although possessing some evidentiary value, is legally
insufficient to prove conspiratorial conduct or concert of action. In re Japanese Elec. Prods.,
723 F.2d at 304.
126. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 605 (citing In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 304-05
(3d Cir. 1983)).
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horizontal agreements to allocate customers normally do not injure
competitors of the agreeing parties, a factfinder could reasonably infer
that the defendants intended to eliminate competition among them-
selves in Japan and the United States and collusively establish below-
cost dumping prices in the United States market.
27
The majority found that the Third Circuit erred because it
"failed to consider the absence of a plausible motive to engage in
predatory pricing."'' 28 However, the dissent, concluded that the issue
is not whether a court believes the expert opinions, such as the De-
Podwin Report. The courts, according to the dissent, are not to con-
duct "academic discussions" but instead the courts are to decide
whether the plaintiffs' evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion for summary judgment. 29 Consequently, the
dissent believes that Zenith and NUE's evidence established genuine
issues of material fact and would have affirmed the Third Circuit's
judgment. 13
0
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
A. The Sherman Antitrust Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act' 3 ' declares illegal
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade of commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations .... ,,'32 First substantively enforced
during the Progressive Era, 33 the Sherman Act "rests on the premise
127. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 605. The dissent found no fault with the reasoning of the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals which held that "a factfinder might reasonably infer that the
allocation of customers in the United States, combined with price-fixing in Japan, was intended
to permit concentration of the effects of dumping upon American competitors while eliminat-
ing competition among the Japanese manufacturers in either market." In re Japanese Elec.
Prod, 723 F.2d at 311.
128. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 595 (1986). Justice
White wrote that the majority faulted the court of appeals for not being "sufficiently skeptical
of respondents' allegation that petitioners engaged in predatory pricing conspiracy." Id. at
605.
129. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 606.
130. Id. at 607.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
132. Id.
133. The Progressive Era represented a period of United States history characterized by a
"crusading spirit" against unethical practices by domestic corporations. During this period,
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 15, 16, 18, 21, 26, 27, 18 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402, 660, 29 U.S.C.
§ 52 (1982) (prohibiting mergers, tying agreements, inter-locking corporate directorates and
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that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the
best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the high-
est quality and the greatest material progress while ... providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political
and social institutions."
1 34
The courts, however, have not always applied the literal language
of the statute. Instead, the courts began to analyze the effects of the
alleged illegal conduct. Consequently, in addition to the approach,
the courts developed the rule of reason approach to evaluate alleged
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
1. The Per Se Rule Approach
Two methods of analysis are used by the courts to evaluate con-
duct alleged to unreasonably restrain trade. Early Supreme Court an-
titrust cases applied the literal language of the Sherman Act. Per se
135
violations of section one, were presumed to inhibit competition re-
gardless of the degree of unreasonableness. Consequently, such viola-
tions did not require an evaluation of their actual anti-competitive
effect and were considered per se illegal. For example, in United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,I36 the Supreme Court
concluded that all restraints of trade were illegal, regardless of
whether they were reasonable or not.
137
This approach was reemphasized in United States v. Trenton Pot-
teries Co.' 38 In Trenton Potteries, the Court stated that cartel agree-
exclusive dealings), the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-43, 11703, 11902, 11903, 11915, 11916
(1982) (further regulating the railroads), the Pure Food and Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92
(1982) (creating the Food and Drug Administration), the Underwood Tariff Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1905, 19 U.S.C. §§ 124, 128, 130, 131, 46 U.S.C. § 146 (1982) (reducing import tariffs), and
the Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)
(1982) (establishing the Federal Reserve banking system) were signed into law.
134. Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). One commentator writes:
[a]ntitrust in the United States rests on two premises. The first is the English com-
mon law as it evolved through court decisions over a long period of time. In general
these decisions held that restraint on trade or commerce are not in the public interest
.... The second premise is the belief that competition is an effective regulator of
most markets and, with a few exceptions, that monopolistic practices can be stopped
by competition.
M. SCHNITZER, CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS RELATIONS 133 (2d ed.
1983).
135. The term "per se" was first applied in 1940, in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
136. 166 U.S. 290 (1897). Trans-Missouri was the first section 1 case to reach the Supreme
Court.
137. Id. at 312, 341.
138. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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ment which fixed prices and limited sales, was per se invalid, and did
not require a detailed inquiry as to whether a particular price is rea-
sonable or unreasonable.' 39 This approach was narrowed in other
cases which applied the Sherman Act only to direct agreements re-
straining trade. 140 The clear definition of the per se approach not only
provides companies with predictable consequences for conduct re-
straining trade, but may also invalidate activity resulting in no harm
or actually benefitting competition. 14 Consequently, the Supreme
Court began to evaluate alleged anti-competitive conduct by examin-
ing its impact.
2. The Rule of Reason Approach
Economic efficiency was first considered to determine an alleged
antitrust violation and restraint of trade in United States v. Joint Traf-
fic Association.142 The Court, however, did not adopt the standard in
its analysis. The rule of reason approach was first applied by Chief
Justice White in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.143 Standard Oil,
by purchasing competitors through stock acquisitions, had acquired
control almost ninety percent of the production and transportation of
petroleum in the United States.' 44 Standard Oil's market control,
based on stock ownership, however, did not rely on agreements which
directly inhibited competition. This forced the Supreme Court to re-
examine the per se analysis. The Court applied a test of reasonable-
ness, based upon the purpose of the arrangement, the monopoly
power of the defendant, and the impact on the marketplace. 145 Thus,
the Court accepted the lower court's holding that Standard Oil's pur-
pose was to obtain monopoly power and therefore was an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade.' 46
In Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,' 47 the Supreme
Court adopted a case-by-case balancing test. Continental T V man-
139. Id. at 397.
140. See, e.g., Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898).
141. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (Supreme
Court found that a geographically restrictive franchise agreement actually benefited
competition).
142. 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
143. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
144. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31-43 (1911). This indirect method of
gaining market share control, here through stock acquisitions became known as a "trust."
145. Id. at 66.
146. Id. at 74.
147. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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dated that the courts must balance, in each case, the agreement's com-
petitive benefits against the burdens placed on competition.
148
Therefore, the modem rule of reason approach primarily analyzes the
conduct to determine its effect on economic efficiency and competi-
tion in the marketplace. 149 Consequently, an agreement to restrain
trade does not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act if the overall result
consists of increased economic efficiency and competition.
15 0
As the rule of reason standard developed, section 2 of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act prohibited a party from possessing monopoly
power in the relevant market, and having no other "legitimate" busi-
ness objective to support the allegedly illegal pricing policy. I5 ' For
example, producing a superior product, normal business growth, or
historical accident may constitute legitimate business objectives.
Thus, while section 1 of the Sherman Act focuses on anti-competitive
business transactions and agreements, section 2 focuses on misuse of
monopoly power. Consequently, the court logically focuses on
whether the defendant possessed the requisite monopoly power, since
a company lacking sufficient monopoly power cannot impose its will
upon the marketplace.
3. Monopolistic Market Share Power
Although traditional economic analysis defines market power as
the ability to conduct business without regard to competitive condi-
tions, antitrust laws apply a much narrower standard. 5 2 The "struc-
tural approach" is the most widely accepted method used by the
courts to determine whether a defendant possesses sufficient market
148. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCI-
PLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1503a (1986).
149. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). In
Broadcast Music the Court, quoted: "'[t]he Sherman Act has always been discriminately ap-
plied in light of economic realities' " and upheld the defendants' licensing arrangement
designed to lower costs and increase efficiency. Id. at 14 (quoting Memorandum for United
States as Amicus Curiae on Pet. for Cert. in K-19, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 389 U.S.
805, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1967)).
150. For example, a territorial restriction in a franchise agreement may increase economic
efficiency and competition by minimizing injurious "excess" competition. Without such re-
strictions, after fierce competition in the marketplace subsides, fewer retailers may survive,
thereby reducing competition. Consequently, a reasonable territorial restriction may preserve
competition by promoting economic efficiency by ensuring a number of retailers in a geograph-
ical area.
151. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). The Court in
American Tobacco upheld the judgment against separate tobacco companies which conspired
to acquire and maintain collective monopoly power. Id. at 809.
152. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 148, 507.
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power to be considered monopolistic. 153 Monopoly power exists if a
defendant, or combination of defendants, possesses "the power to con-
trol prices or exclude competition." 154 "The material consideration in
determining whether a monopoly exists is not that prices have been
raised or that competition actually is excluded, but that power exists
to raise prices or exclude competition when it is desired to do so."155
Consequently, to obtain monopoly power the defendant or de-
fendants usually control a very high proportionate share of the rele-
vant market. "The existence of such power ordinarily may be
inferred from [possessing] the predominant share of the market."1 56
However, courts are reluctant to arbitrarily declare that a certain per-
centage of market share constitutes monopoly power. 157 Thus, the
courts rarely find monopoly power absent control by the defendants
of a dramatically high proportionate market share.
4. Allegations of Conspiracy
Plaintiffs alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade between multiple
defendants face difficult evidentiary problems because co-conspirators
rarely provide direct evidence of an agreement to restrain trade.' 58
For example, business records of a single entity seldomly provide di-
rect evidence of a conspiracy. Consequently, most evidence provided
to prove a conspiracy is circumstantial. This circumstantial evidence,
although marginally relevant, "may nevertheless be taken into ac-
count along with such direct evidence. ..,,59 to prove that concerted
action between the defendants occurred. 160
The plaintiffs' evidence must also exclude the possibility that the
defendants acted with "conscious parallelism."' 6' For example, many
153. See id. Market shares are initially calculated by comparing the number of companies
within the relevant market against their respective sales. Monopoly power is inferred by pos-
sessing a threshold of market power. Id. 1 529-35.
154. United States v. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
155. American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 811.
156. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
157. For example, possessing " 'over two-thirds of the entire domestic field of cigarettes,
and . . . over 80% of the field of comparable cigarettes' constituted a 'substantial monopoly.'"
Id. at 571 (citing American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946)).
In Grinnell, the companies held eighty-seven percent of the accredited central stations
service business, and the Supreme Court found "no doubt.., these defendants have monopoly
power .... Id.
158. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 304 (3d Cir. 1983).
159. Id. at 305.
160. Id.
161. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984).
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corporations in the same industry follow similar marketing, produc-
tion, and distribution methods which are not themselves illegal.
Thus, the plaintiffs must prove that the defendants acted in concert,
and not independently.
Moreover, the evidence must present an economically plausible
theory. The plaintiffs allegations of a conspiracy must be consistent
with conveying some economic benefit, even in the future, upon the
defendant-conspirators. For example, a plaintiff, in alleging that an
agreement which would produce only losses for the conspirators vio-
lates United States antitrust laws, must explain the ultimate advan-
tage that the defendants would obtain after completing their objective.
Thus, if the plaintiffs' claim lacks economic sense, the evidence must
provide more persuasive evidence than usually necessary to prove that
a conspiracy existed.
62
5. Application to the Matsushita Decision
The Supreme Court in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp. did not apply the per se rule. If the Court had
applied the per se rule, the majority would certainly have upheld the
judgment of the court of appeals, based upon the lower court's finding
of agreements which attempted to restrain trade.163 Agreements,
such as those entered into by the defendants here, have been invali-
dated by the Court without examining their actual economic and
competitive effects. The Supreme Court, however, did examine the
effects of the alleged anti-competitive agreements and thus followed
the rule of reason approach.164
By analyzing the effect of the defendants' conduct, the Court
avoided invalidating agreements commissioned, in part, by the gov-
ernment of Japan. The flexibility of this approach allows agreements
benefiting competition to be upheld, without impairing United States
foreign relations.
The majority emphasized that the plaintiffs did not suffer any
cognizable antitrust harm. Justice Powell explained that, although
the check price agreements and the five-company rule may have
harmed competition, Zenith and NUE actually benefited from the re-
162. See First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 277-80 (1968).
163. Examples are: the five-company rule which limited wholesale distribution in the
United States and the check price agreements which placed a bottom on prices in the United
States.
164. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
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suiting higher prices. 165 Therefore, the Court correctly concluded
that the plaintiffs were not injured by the alleged illegal conduct.
The majority, however, dismisses too quickly the possibility that
the overall effect of higher prices in Japan and lower prices in the
United States harmed competition.166 The Court refused to draw in-
ferences from the empirical studies and agreements placed in evi-
dence.' 67 The majority believed that the agreements which raised
prices in Japan were outside the reach of United States antitrust
laws. 168 Thus, any harm resulting to Zenith and NUE originated, in
Japan.
The Sherman Antitrust Act has long been applied to conduct
occurring in foreign countries having a foreseeable effect on United
States commerce. The Supreme Court, however, did not fully address
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act. If the agreements
in Japan fell under the extraterritorial application of United States
antitrust laws, Zenith's and NUE's claims would have been much
more substantial.
The majority believed that plaintiffs Zenith and NUE failed to
provide a plausible explanation for the defendants' conduct. Thus,
the Court found that the defendants could not have engaged in a
predatory pricing conspiracy. Moreover, without a compelling mo-
tive to conspire, no genuine issue of fact existed for trial, entitling the
defendants to summary judgment.
Raising prices and limiting distribution, obviously, is not a logi-
cal method to obtain customers. Predatory pricing does not result in
higher prices. 169 Instead, such conduct usually results in lowered
165. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596 (1986). The
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could not "recover damages for any conspiracy by [the
defendants] to charge higher than competitive prices in the American market." Id. at 582-83.
166. It must be remembered that the appeal is reviewing a summary judgment ruling. In a
motion for summary judgment, "evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the
party opposing [here the plaintiffs] summary judgment." Id. at 601. See also First Nat'l Bank
of Ariz. v. Cities Serv., 391 U.S. 253 (1968); and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752 (1984).
167. The Supreme Court did not review the evidentiary rulings of the court of appeals,
which admitted much of the evidence ruled inadmissible by the district court. The Court,
however, does not mention which evidentiary record it reviews: the greatly enlarged court of
appeals record or the much smaller district court record.
168. The application of United States antitrust laws is discussed later in this Note; see
infra text accompanying notes 185-283.
169. "Unless acting irrationally or out of ignorance, the firm is likely to be charging the
lower price in order to preserve or enhance its market share by deterring rivals." Areeda &
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
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prices. Conspiratory pricing, however, may be undertaken to obtain a
future gain. For example, if used with predatory pricing, parties to
such agreements may limit competition among themselves. The de-
fendants may have intended to minimize predatory pricing among
Japanese CEP manufacturers by limiting the distribution of these
company's products. Although a motive may be ascertained, proof,
of course, is an entirely different issue. Consequently, the Court, con-
sidering the possible harm on positive business practices, required
that plaintiffs Zenith and NUE provide direct evidence of the conspir-
acy. Absent such evidence from the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court ex-
pressed reluctance to infer an illegal motive and conduct from the
circumstantial evidence presented.
It is unclear how persuasive the majority considered the plain-
tiffs' empirical evidence provided by both academic institutions 70 and
economic consulting firms.' 7' Dr. DePodwin, in his report, con-
cluded that "the Japanese television manufacturers' export agreement
was part of a generally collusive scheme embracing the Japanese do-
mestic market as well." 172 The report also summarized the harm to
United States television manufacturers, such as Zenith and NUE, re-
sulting from the collusive behavior, as "very severe."'
' 7 3
Academic and consultants' reports cannot create evidence of ille-
gal conduct. However, the reports tend to corroborate the plaintiffs'
evidence of the agreements to restrain trade and predatorily price, and
the defendants' motive to engage in such conduct. Justice White,
writing for the dissent, found Zenith and NUE's evidence important
in formulating his opinion. The dissent found that "[t]he DePodwin
Report alone create[d] a genuine issue regarding the harm caused to
[Zenith and NUE] by Japanese cartelization and by agreements re-
stricting competition among [defendants] in this country.'1
7 4
Although non-price restraints, 75 such as the five-company rule,
HARV. L. REV. 697, 704 (1975); see also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. LAW. &
ECON. 289, 295-97 (1980).
170. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 279-84 (3d Cir. 1983); see also infra
text accompanying notes 174-75.
171. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 279-84.
172. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 602 n.2 (1986)
(quoting 5 App. to Brief for Appellants at 1629a-30a).
173. Id.
174. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 603 (White, J., dissenting).
175. Dr. DePodwin notes that such restraints are diametrically opposed to a basic under-
standing of competition, that companies act independently. Id. at 602-03 n.3 (quoting Brief
for Appellants at 1628a-29a).
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may have restricted competition, the Court did not examine their to-
tal effect on competition. The five-company rule assured that each
manufacturer had reasonably fixed customers despite the pricing
structure.1 76 Predatory pricing becomes less risky if a manufacturer
possesses a stable distribution base and also does not fear erosion of
the distribution base from competitors agreeing to restrict their own
distribution. The tremendous growth allowed the Japanese consumer
electronics producers to invest in new plants and equipment and ex-
pand their production capacity. 177 The additional capacity enabled
the Japanese television industry to lower production costs and provide
more products thus enabling them to capture more of the United
States market "than they would have had they competed lawfully.1' 78
The collective market share of the CEP producers may have been
insufficient to constitute monopoly power, 179 even assuming the con-
spiracy existed and was effective. Although the courts refuse to arbi-
trarily declare that control of a certain percentage of market share is
monopolistic, the defendants probably did not control a sufficient
market share. 1 80 Standard Oil, for example, controlled ninety percent
of the United States petroleum market.181 In the instant case, how-
ever, the defendants' collective market share had risen to about fifty
percent. Thus, although the defendants possessed a substantial mar-
ket share, at the time of trial the remaining competitors still con-
trolled the remaining half of the CEP market. The defendants
probably lacked "the power to control prices or exclude competi-
tion." 18 2 Thus, the collective Japanese manufactures market share
was insufficient to be monopolistic.18 3
In summary, the majority's approach, although not clear in its
analysis, was correct in its decision. Zenith and NUE presented insuf-
176. Id.
177. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 602-03 n.3.
178. Id.
179. Even in 1985, total CEP imports comprised sixty-three percent of the United States
market. See supra note 2. Cf. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 33 (1927). In Stan-
dard Oil, the combination had "obtained a complete mastery over the oil industry, controlling
90 percent of the business.., and thus was able to... restrain and monopolize all interstate
commerce in those products." Id.
180. See supra note 179.
181. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
182. United States v. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). See generally
Areeda & Turner, supra note 169.
183. The Japanese defendants' share of the CEP market was at its high during the com-
plained of period, from the late 1950's to the late 1970's. The collective market share was
almost fifty percent. The Wall St. J., supra note 2, at 16, cols. 2-3.
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ficient direct evidence to negate the possibility that the defendants ac-
ted with conscious parallelism. Additionally, the defendants
controlled insufficient collective market share to be considered mo-
nopoly power.
The Supreme Court's opinion, however, failed to address numer-
ous important issues under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Court
did not fully discuss the proper standard for asserting extraterrito-
rial 18 4 subject matter jurisdiction and the breadth of the sovereign
compulsion defense.
B. Establishing Jurisdiction: Extraterritorial Application of United
States Antitrust Laws
1. Background
The United States Supreme Court described the Sherman Anti-
trust Act "as important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of
our fundamental personal freedoms."' s5 However, the United States'
"economic bill of rights," at times, is diametrically opposed to our
country's interests in foreign policy and relations. Problems arise, for
example, when United States laws attempt to reach economic activi-
ties and conduct occurring in another country. 18 6 Additionally, be-
cause no accepted standard exists for evaluating whether foreign
conduct is subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act, foreign nations and
corporations are unable to adequately predict future legal conse-
quences of their activities in United States courts. Consequently, for-
eign sovereigns have "resented and protested, as excessive intrusions
into their own sphere, broad assertions of authority by American
courts."1
8 7
2. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.
Federal antitrust laws are limited by Congressional power to reg-
ulate interstate commerce. The Constitution provides that "Congress
184. Extraterritoriality, as used in this Note, is a nation's right to control and regulate
activities within its border and conduct occurring outside the country that cause harm within
its borders.
185. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). The economic objective of
the Sherman Act is to "maximize consumer economic welfare through efficiency in the use and
allocation of scarce resources .... " P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 148, 103.
186. Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality, 19 INT'L LAW. 887, 889
(1985).
187. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Amer., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976).
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shall have the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations
.... 188 The Sherman Antitrust Act, however, does not fully exercise
this seemingly broad power over foreign trade granted pursuant to the
commerce clause. 189 "[T]he tenets of international law which limit
legislative jurisdiction, the inability of courts to obtain personal juris-
diction, and the doctrine of comity have tempered the expansive reach
of the Sherman Act over foreign commerce."' 190 Consequently, the
courts have extended jurisdiction in antitrust matters if the questioned
conduct had an impact upon United States commerce.' 9'
"Few aspects of the Sherman Act have generated as much con-
troversy over such an extended period as its application to 'trade com-
merce ... with foreign nations.' 192 The judicial power asserted by
United States courts over activity in other nations, however, may in-
trude upon the sovereignty of the affected country. Private litigants,
as in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. "may
implicate foreign policy concerns without evaluating considerations of
comity that are necessarily undertaken prior to the initiation of legal
proceedings by the government."'
' 93
The Matsushita Court briefly addressed the jurisdiction of United
States antitrust laws. Justice Powell began by stating that absent the
requisite "effect" in the United States marketplace, the plaintiffs' alle-
gations were not cognizable "because American antitrust laws do not
regulate the competitive conditions of other nations' economies."
' 194
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
189. See E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 5.4 (1980).
190. Id.
191. Id. For example, the Sherman Act applies to anticompetitive agreements between
domestic and foreign firms, foreign companies selling in the United States market, joint corpo-
rations between foreign and domestics companies, or foreign subsidiaries of United States com-
panies. Under section seven of the Sherman Act, the antitrust laws apply to foreign commerce
if:
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign na-
tions, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, or a person en-
gaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this Act ....
Export Trading Company Act, Pub. L. No. 97-2920, 96 Stat. 1246 (1982) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 1 1986)).
192. E. KINTNER, supra note 189, § 7.1. The application of the Sherman Act to foreign
commerce has "been the catalyst for diplomatic protests, international disputes, and retalia-
tory legislation by foreign governments." Id.
193. Dunfee & Friedman, The Extra-Territorial Application of United States Antitrust
Laws: A Proposal for An Interim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 893 (1984).
194. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986).
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The Court clarifies this seemingly contradictory statement by stating
that "the Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but
only when the conduct has an effect on American commerce."
195
Thus, "[a] conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or for-
eign commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the
Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained of occurs in
foreign countries."
196
3. The Alcoa "Effects" Test
The Supreme Court in Matsushita relied upon the much criti-
cized 197 rationale of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Al-
coa).198 In Alcoa, the United States filed suit under the Sherman Act
for judicial dissolution of a corporate monopoly, and alleged illegal
restraints of trade in both interstate and foreign commerce. 199 The
Canadian subsidiary of Alcoa, Limited, allegedly participated in a
cartel (Alliance) with aluminum producers from Great Britain,
France and Switzerland. 200 The Alliance cartel allegedly conspired to
allocate production and restrict importation into the United States. 2° 1
195. Id. at 582 & n.6.
196. Id. (quoting Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962)).
197. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). In
Timberlane, Judge Choy asserted that the "effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to
consider other nations' interests. Nor does it expressly take into account the full nature of the
relationship between the actors and this country." Id. at 611-12. The Timberlane court cited
numerous commentators who concluded that the courts have not sufficiently considered the
interests of other nations: Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1150
(1956); A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE USA 362-72 (2d ed. 1970); Fortenberry,
Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Antitrust Violations, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 521, 534-36 (1971).
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611,612 n.3. See also Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 704
F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731
F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Other nations, the United Kingdom in particular, "have questioned various applications
of U.S. law as 'exorbitant.' . . . In particular, some states have questioned the lawfulness of
applying the 'effects doctrine,'... to economics effects." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 403, Reporters' Note 1 (Tent. Draft
No. 7, 1986).
198. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit acted under certification from the Supreme
Court because the Court was unable to formulate a quorum of six qualified justices to hear the
case. Consequently, the case was referred back to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for
rehearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2109 (1982). Thus, the appellate court's decision here in Alcoa was
final.
199. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 420-21 (2d Cir. 1945).
200. Id. at 442-44.
201. Id.
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Judge Learned Hand concluded that "it is settled law . . . that
any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its alle-
giance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other
states will ordinarily recognize. '20 2 The appellate court construed the
Sherman Act to apply to extraterritorial acts which were both in-
tended 20 3 and had an effect in United States territory.2°4 "The pre-
vailing interpretation of this 'effects test' is that the impact of foreign
conduct on U.S. commerce must be direct, substantial, and reason-
ably foreseeable. '20
5
The territorial approach under Alcoa is criticized as inflexible
and unduly broad. Consequently, problems arose under the "in-
tended effects" test, because it failed to consider external political and
economic factors of asserting jurisdiction of United States antitrust
law upon foreign nations. Moreover, the objective territorial principle
of Alcoa, "especially in cases involving conduct which is not consid-
ered criminal in many nations, are too remote and too difficult to es-
tablish to provide an appropriate basis for jurisdiction. ' 20 6
Subsequent changes in Alcoa's approach by later courts were confined
to the standard's overall framework. 20 7
The inflexibility of this approach, however, has "resulted in an
escalation of legal confrontations between the U.S. and foreign na-
tions. ' 20 8  International conflicts have usually occurred in three
scenarios:
(1) [ajpplying U.S. antitrust laws to competition from a foreign
state controlled or subsidized companies;
202. Id. at 443 (citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1910)).
203. Intent to affect United States commerce may be inferred from surrounding circum-
stances. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 243 (1899); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1189 n.65 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("It
is plain that the intent required is general, not specific.").
204. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
Judge Hand found that -[i]t is settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities . . . for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state repre-
hends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize." Id. at 443.
205. Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 193, at 886.
206. E. KINTNER, supra note 189, § 7.9. Supporters of the Alcoa decision point out that
no mechanism exists for international enforcement against anti-competitive behavior occurring
in more than one country. Additionally, they contend that, subsequent to Alcoa, "foreign
firms have been on notice that anti-competitive conduct which intentionally affects United
States commerce is subject to United States assertions of jurisdiction." Id.
207. Comment, The Expanding Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Sherman Antitrust Act:
Intent and Effects in the Balance?, 6 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 463, 470 (1983).
208. Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 193, at 883.
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(2) [a]pplying U.S. antitrust laws to apparently private cartel ar-
rangements for natural resources or other economic policies funda-
mental to American trading partners; and
(3) [i]ntrusive discovery orders to produce foreign confidential
data by U.S. courts.
20 9
These conflicts arose in In re Uranium Litigation.210 Plaintiff
Westinghouse 'filed suit against twenty-nine foreign and domestic
companies which formed a cartel in response to United States legisla-
tion which prevented the importation of uranium.21 1 In response,
Australia, England, South Africa, and Canada passed legislation
which prohibited compliance with the plaintiff's discovery requests,
which they believed infringed upon their national sovereignty. 212 The
four nations filed amicus briefs which claimed the United States
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 2 13 Default judgment, then, was en-
tered against the foreign defendants who refused to appear.214
Although the parties ultimately settled their dispute, the four nations
maintained their respective protective legislation. 215
The Supreme Court, thus, left subsequent refinement of Judge
Hand's extraterritorial approach to the lower federal courts.216 Sub-
sequent case law did not challenge Alcoa's basic approach.217 Thirty-
five years after Alcoa, the perceived deficiencies in the intended effects
standard produced a more complex approach to asserting antitrust
jurisdiction.
4. The Timberlane Jurisdictional Rule of Reason Standard
During the past decade, the federal circuit courts began to adopt
the test enunciated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
209. Commission on the International Application of the U.S. Antitrust Laws Act: Hearings
on S. 432 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 271 (1981).
210. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. I11. 1979), aff'd, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); see also
Note, The Effects Test vs. Act of State Considerations: A Comparison of the OPEC and Westing-
house Decisions, 53 COLO. L. REV. 677 (1982).
211. In re Uranium Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1253.
214. Id. at 1250.
215. Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 193, at 889.
216. Comment, The Expanding Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 207, at 470 (citing
1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 151 (2d ed.
1981)).
217. Id.
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Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.218 In Timberlane, the
plaintiffs alleged that bank officials residing in both the United States
and Honduras conspired to prevent Timberlane from milling lumber
and exporting it to the United States. 219 A Honduran judicial lien
was placed upon the property of a Honduran lumber company by a
local subsidiary of the United States bank.220 The debtor violated the
court order by selling some of its assets to Timberlane. 221 Timberlane
alleged a conspiracy to prevent the company from entering the Hon-
duran lumber market to compete with other companies-also cus-
tomers of the bank.222 The plaintiffs claimed the aggrieved conduct
affected United States' imports and consequently foreign commerce of
the United States.
223
The Ninth Circuit adopted a "jurisdictional rule of reason,
'224
believing that "[tihe effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails
to consider other nations' interests. Nor does it expressly take into
account the full nature of the relationship between the actors and this
country. ' 225 Consequently, Judge Choy sought to interject comity
into the extraterritoriality analysis.
The court of appeals asserted jurisdiction after applying a tripar-
tite standard:
[First,] [d]oes the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to af-
fect, the foreign commerce of the United States? [Second,] [i]s it of
such type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the
Sherman Act? [Third,] [a]s a matter of international comity and
fairness, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States
be asserted to cover it?226
Consequently, jurisdiction under the Sherman Antitrust Act is
established if some effect, actual or intended, occurred in the United
States market. 227 Jurisdiction, however, under Timberlane did not re-
218. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd,
749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984).
219. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1976).
220. Id. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the Honduran judge issued the lien after
accepting a bribe. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1976).
224. The jurisdictional rule of reason approach is also known as "discretionary jurisdic-
tion." P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 237 (Supp. 1986).
225. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611-12.
226. Id. at 615.
227. P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 224, 237.
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quire an allegation or appearance of "direct or substantial effects. ' '228
Additionally, the Sherman Act must address and provide a cognizable
remedy against the allegedly illegal restraint of trade.229 This section
of the analysis is a corollary to the normal proof required to prove an
antitrust violation under the per se approach or the rule of reason. 230
Third, and most importantly, whether "international comity and fair-
ness counseled against exerting jurisdiction over extra-territorial con-
duct. ' 231 Here, the court will balance any potential foreign policy or
law conflict against the interests of the United States in asserting ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction, after evaluating:
(1) the degree of conflict with foreign law of policy, (2) the nation-
ality or allegiance of the parties and their principal places of busi-
ness, (3) the extent to which either state can expect compliance,
(4) the relative effects upon the several countries involved, (5) an
explicit purpose to harm or affect United States commerce and the
foreseeability of such an effect, and (6) the relative importance of
the conduct inside the United States.
232
The Timberlane approach grants a trial court much more discre-
tion compared to the intended effects standard of Alcoa. As a result,
the court may refuse to assert jurisdiction after balancing the effect on
United States foreign commerce against considerations of policy and
comity, despite the apparent existence of anti-competitive restraints.
Additionally, this flexibility helps to preserve the integrity of United
States antitrust laws. For example, the court may decline to assert
jurisdiction over a defendant sued by a private litigant because the
plaintiff's suit implicates United States foreign relations, or the court
lacks the ability to enforce its judgment against the defendant. Addi-
tionally, conduct which violates United States antitrust laws may not
violate the domestic laws of the foreign corporation.
a. comity
The Timberlane jurisdictional rule of reason seeks to protect
comity in the international marketplace. Comity requires that the
United States courts give equal weight to sovereign authority which is
given to similar domestic authority. 23  Moreover, comity must pro-
228. In other words, the Alcoa test.
229. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 749 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1984).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1384-85.
233. See Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Many West-
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tect the national interest, because unlike products which freely move
between international boundaries, sovereignty ends at a country's
borders.
234
Under the Restatement approach, comity does not require reci-
procity from the affected foreign nation. 235 The jurisdiction to pre-
scribe laws "does not depend on any finding that another state would
exercise its jurisdiction to the same extent, though some elements of
reciprocity may be relevant .... ,,236 Additionally, "[t]he doctrine of
comity provides that on the basis of politeness, convenience, and
goodwill, states will refrain from fully exercising their power in order
to reach an internationally acceptable accommodation. ' 237  Thus,
countries must rely on each other to assist enforcement of its policies
and laws outside its own territory. "Although comity is not a legal
defense, it may be employed as a basis for a request that enforcement
officials refrain from exercising their power to it fullest extent in order
to preserve friendly diplomatic relations.
'23
b. acceptance in the legal community
i. the federal circuits
The Timberlane decision inspired an attempt to create a uniform
standard which required courts to evaluate and balance numerous
factors before asserting jurisdiction. In addition to the Ninth Circuit,
four other federal circuits have adopted similar approaches, including
the Second,239 Third, 240 Fifth,241 and Tenth 242 Circuits. The ap-
ern nations have antitrust laws based on similar principles as the United States. See infra note
281 and accompanying text.
234. For example, the United States Department of Justice consults with other agencies
prior to prosecuting antitrust cases affecting foreign relations. See infra text accompanying
note 252; see also infra note 266.
235. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 197, comment
a.
236. Id.
237. E. KINTNER, supra note 189, § 7.9 n.153. See generally Yntema, The Comity Doc-
trine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1966).
238. E. KINTNER, supra note 189, § 7.9.
239. See, e.g., Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D.
Pa. 1981).
240. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
241. See, e.g., Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
242. See, e.g., Montreal Trading v. Amax, 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1001 (1982).
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proaches of the five federal circuits similarly require a complex and
multilevel comity analysis prior to asserting extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
For example, the Third Circuit adopted this approach in Man-
nington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 243 In Mannington, the court of
appeals indicated "a preference for retaining [the] Alcoa standards for
the threshold effects determination."' 244 Consequently, the court ap-
plied an expanded set of factors in its jurisdictional analysis, evaluat-
ing the availability of a remedy in another country, the possibility a
defendant may be subject to conflicting legal obligations and whether
a treaty with the affected country addresses the issue.
245
ii. the United States Department of Justice
The jurisdictional rule of reason analysis has also been substan-
tially adopted by the United States Department of Justice. 246 In Mat-
sushita, the Reagan Administration submitted an amicus curiae
brief.247 The Justice Department, relying on Alcoa and Timberlane,
asserted that "the Sherman Act can reach . . . anti-competitive re-
243. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
244. Comment, Expanding Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, supra note 207, at 474 (citing
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3d Cir. 1979)).
245. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
The set of factors balanced by the Third Circuit in Mannington were the:
(1) Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
(2) Nationality of the parties;
(3) Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to
abroad;
(4) Availability of a remedy abroad and pendency of litigation there;
(5) Existence of intent to harm or to affect American commerce and its
foreseeability;
(6) Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and
grants relief;
(7) If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced
to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by
both countries;
(8) Whether the court can make its order effective;
(9) Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances; [and]
(10) Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Id. at 1297-98.
246. See, e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST Div., ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS 6-7 (rev. 1977) (cited in Dunfee & Friedman, The Extra-Territorial Ap-
plication of United States Antitrust Laws: A Proposal for an Interim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
883, 886 n.21 (1984)).
247. It should be noted that most of the Department of Justice's brief addressed the issues
of the sovereign compulsion defense and the standard for summary judgment for conspiracies
alleged under the Sherman Act.
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straints that occur wholly overseas but have a direct, substantial and
reasonably foreseeable effect on American commerce." 248 Through-
out the brief, the Solicitor General asserted the potential foreign pol-
icy implications2 49 of inflexibly applying the Sherman Act.2 50
Additionally, the Justice Department adopts a Timberlane-like
approach prior to filing suit against foreign defendants. "In recent
years the Department of Justice has shown a keen awareness of the
reactions of other governments to U.S. antitrust enforcement ... and
has stressed the factors of comity and foreign relations. ' ' 251 Prior to
filing and prosecuting antitrust cases which may potentially affect re-
lations with foreign governments, the Justice Department also con-
sults with the Departments of State and Defense, and other
agencies.25
2
iii. the restatement of foreign relations law
of the United States
The American Law Institute's Restatement (Revised) of the For-
eign Relations Law of the United States also substantially adopts the
Timberlane approach. The Restatement requires a court to initially
consider relevant factors to determine if the exercise of jurisdiction is
unreasonable.2 53  The enumerated list of factors, however, is not
248. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (No. 83-2004) [hereinafter Brief
for the United States].
249. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 233-38.
250. For example, the Justice Department contends that "an unlimited application of the
antitrust laws in the international context would have far-reaching and potentially destructive
results." Id. at 19.
251. II W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 15.1 (1982).
252. Id. § 15.7 (citing Vol. I, Commission's Rep. to the President; Vol. II Special Studies
(1979)).
253. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 197, § 403.
The Restatement draft provides:
(1) a state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to the activi-
ties, relations, status, or interests of persons or things having connections with an-
other state or states when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable or unreasonable is judged by
evaluating all the relevant factors, including, where appropriate,
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regulating state,
or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state;
(b) the connections.., between the regulating state and the persons princi-
pally responsible... or between that state and those whom the law or regulation is
designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity.., the importance of regulation to the regulat-
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J
exhaustive.254
The Restatement proposal recognizes the need for comity in ap-
plying United States laws to conduct occurring abroad. Comity,
under the Restatement, however, "does not depend on any finding
that another state would exercise its jurisdiction to the same ex-
tent .... ",255 A court following Section 403 should decline to assert
jurisdiction if after evaluating the "activities, relations, status, or in-
terests . . ." of the United States and other affected nations, the court
believes that exercising jurisdiction is unreasonable. 25 6 "[T]he princi-
ple of reasonableness calls for limiting the exercise of jurisdiction so as
to minimize conflict with the jurisdiction of other states.5 257
5. Structural Problems in Exercising Antitrust Jurisdiction
Inherent structural limitations in the ability of the federal judici-
ary to adequately address the issues which arise when a private plain-
tiff seeks to invoke the extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States
antitrust laws. The complexity of the rule of reason standard may
strain judicial resources, which are very limited compared to the other
branches of government. For example, as in Matsushita,2 8 comity
considerations require the court to evaluate a tremendous amount of
evidence in addition to the already burdensome tasks of evaluating
complex antitrust issues. Additionally, the trial court must ascertain
the veracity of volumes of foreign-originated evidence and legal argu-
ments presented by both counsel and foreign sovereigns. 25 9 Conse-
quently, the courts are not well-positioned to properly evaluate all
ing state .... and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) . . . justified expectations .
(e) the importance of the regulation in question to the international political,
legal or economic system;
(f) the extent ... consistent with the traditions of the international system;
(g) the extent ... another state may have an interest in regulating . ; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
Id.
254. Id. § 403 comment b. Additionally, the factors are not listed according to priority
nor are all the factors equally important in each situation. Id.
255. Id. § 403 comment a.
256. Id. § 403(1).
257. Id. § 403 Reporters' Note 3. If more than one country has a "reasonable basis" for
exercising jurisdiction, a state "should defer to the other state if that state's interest is clearly
greater." Id. § 403(3).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
259. See supra notes 40-42.
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relevant legal,26° economic, 2 6 ' and political 262 criteria and determine
their impact upon the affected nations and international trade.
Legal issues are, of course, within the expertise of the courts.
Economic and political questions, however, provide courts with little
or no reference points to begin their analysis, and thus must be ana-
lyzed on an a case-by-case basis.263 Foreign relations require a court
to balance the interests of the United States against the affected na-
tion. Trial courts will, in effect, create an ever-changing and inconsis-
tent "foreign policy" based on its interpretation of policy and
relations between countries.
Moreover, no structural mechanisms are in place to ensure that
judicial and executive foreign policy pronouncements are consis-
tent.264 Private antitrust litigants, seeking to redress alleged harm,
generally do not evaluate economic and foreign policy considerations
prior to requesting the court to assert jurisdiction over extraterritorial
activities. However, "an unlimited application of the antitrust laws in
the international context would have far-reaching and potentially de-
structive results. '265 Consequently, the United States Department of
Justice evaluates such considerations prior to filing suit to avoid polit-
ical and diplomatic protests by foreign governments.
266
United States antitrust laws must be asserted extraterritorially
under a less complex method of analysis. The standards developed by
Restatement and the federal circuits require additional clarification
and uniformity. Thus, the executive and legislative branches must ad-
dress the problem of the extraterritorial application of United States
antitrust laws.
260. The legal factors include: conflict with foreign law, nationality of parties, availability
of an alternative procedure abroad, enforceability of remedy, coverage by treaty, conduct
within the United States, and purpose to harm United States trade. Dunfee & Friedman, supra
note 193, at 906.
261. The economic factors include: the effect in the United States and the foreseeability of
the effect. Id.
262. The political factors include: conflict with foreign policy, the effect of asserting juris-
diction, importance of effect in involved countries, and relative importance of conduct in both
nations. Id.
263. Economics and political science may present divergent viewpoints which a court
must reconcile against the facts of each case. For example, despite similar facts, each court
may place different values upon the differing political and economic theories and thus arrive at
opposite conclusions.
264. Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 193, at 901.
265. Brief for the United States, supra note 248, at 19.
266. "A decision to bring suit thus amounts to a determination by the executive branch
that the challenged conduct is more harmful to the United States than is any potential injury
to our foreign relationships that will follow from the antitrust action." Id. at 23.
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6. Solutions to Exercising Jurisdiction
Every extraterritorial application of laws infringes on the sover-
eignty of another nation. Antitrust laws review economic, political,
and legal policies of the affected country. Consequently, the courts
must assert jurisdiction by applying a judicially manageable analysis
which also considers foreign policy implications.
a. the Foreign Trade Improvement Act
In 1982, Congress attempted to clarify the extraterritorial juris-
diction of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Foreign Trade Improve-
ments Act of 1982,267 however, is expressly limited to exports.268 The
Act "indicates that the direct and substantial effects test, with the Re-
statement's foreseeable concept added, will continue to be the test for
foreign trade activities. ' ' 269 Therefore, "restraints on export trade
only violate the Sherman Act if they have a direct and substantial
effect on commerce within the United States or on a domestic firm
competing for foreign trade.
'270
Congress thus set forth a standard to be applied to exports in the
Foreign Trade Improvements Act. The direct, substantial and fore-
seeable effects approach may also establish a standard to be applied to
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of United States antitrust laws.
Although the test maintains the expectations of litigants, the Act also
retains the implementation problems encountered in the direct effects
and jurisdictional rule of reason standards. The Act's approach is
similarly judicially unmanageable and lacks sufficient precision and
267. Pub. L. No. 97-290, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., § 402 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7
(Supp. 1 1986)). The amended Sherman Antitrust Act applies to foreign commerce (excluding
import trade or import commerce) if:
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign na-
tions, or on trade or import commerce with foreign nations ....
Id.
The bill "establish[es] that restraints on export trade only violate the Sherman Act if they
have a direct and substantial effect on commerce within the United States or on a domestic
firm competing for foreign trade." H.R. REP. No. 97-686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1982)
(comments of Rep. Rodino), reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1076, at 306
(Aug. 5, 1982).
268. The amendment limits its application to "conduct involving trade or commerce other
than import trade or import commerce with foreign nations .... 5 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 1 1986)
(emphasis added).
269. W. FUGATE, supra note 251, § 2.15a (Supp. 1986).
270. H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1982) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
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clarity to ensure that invocation of United States antitrust jurisdiction
is foreseeable to potential defendants.
b. an interim proposal: principle of prudence
Professors Dunfee and Friedman of the University of Penn-
sylvania's Wharton School propose an interim solution to the extra-
territorial problem. 271 They believe that the legal objectives of any
extraterritorial solution should: (1) prevent gaps in regulation to avoid
"havens" from regulation; (2) provide a positive climate for interna-
tional business transactions; (3) balance the political and economic
interests of both forum and affected country; and (4) balance or inte-
grate procedural and substantive272 law differences among both forum
and affected nation.
273
Dunfee and Friedman propose a bipartite "principle of pru-
dence" analysis. The prudence approach is a hybrid of the intended
effects test of Alcoa and the jurisdictional rule of reason of
Timberlane. First, the trial court applies the intended effects test,
with narrowly construed sovereignty-related defenses. 274 The nar-
rowed defenses further United States' advocated free-trade policy, fol-
low international law, and provide incentives for international
resolution.275
The Timberlane jurisdictional rule of reason analysis would be
applied only in rare circumstances identified by the President of the
United States. 276 Once invoked, the rule of reason analysis must be
applied by the court.277 The authority to invoke the rule grants Presi-
dent additional leverage in foreign negotiations and may avoid unde-
sired diplomatic confrontations caused by private antitrust lawsuits.
The principle of prudence provides a workable interim approach
to extraterritorial antitrust problems because it relies on the less com-
plex Alcoa standard. Dunfee and Friedman's approach, however,
may raise constitutional separation of powers difficulties. The judici-
ary traditionally operates free from direct interference from the execu-
tive and legislative branches. Discretionary presidential authority to
271. Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 193.
272. Id. at 924.
273. Id. at 889.
274. Id. at 923. The authors favor the Alcoa intended effects test's simplicity. Id. See text
accompanying notes 197-217.
275. Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 193, at 925.
276. Id. at 923. This power would be granted to the president by statute. Id.
277. Id. at 924.
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mandate judicial approaches steps beyond the usual method followed
by the executive branch to address legal issues before the court-the
amicus curiae brief. Thus, the principle of prudence may violate the
separation of powers278 by intruding upon the independence of the
judicial system.
c. international agreement
An international agreement provides an opportunity to meet the
economic, political, and legal needs of the United States and other
affected nations. A multi-nation convention could establish a consen-
sus about the parameters of antitrust law, establish legislation in the
form of a treaty, and a mechanism for enforcement. 279 A working
framework for such a meeting should: (1) resolve underlying policy
differences; (2) develop guidelines for asserting authority over conduct
abroad; (3) increase notice, consultation, and cooperation to avoid po-
tential conflicts; (4) expand international cooperation arrangements;
and (5) allow the United States Department of State increased oppor-
tunity to provide advance consultation regarding enforcement action
involving other nation's interests.
2 0
Although many countries share antitrust laws similar to the
United States, 281 reaching agreement may be difficult because of the
vast differences in the substantive law among various Western na-
tions.28 2 International negotiations, however, provide the best long-
term solution because the input of all affected nations is considered.
Such an agreement also provides both subscribing governments and
their constituents foreseeable consequences of anti-competitive activ-
ity. Moreover, a much more workable solution may be produced by
diplomatic negotiations, which operate in an environment much freer
from the restraints of judicial precedent. Additionally, the executive
and legislative branches may establish parameters for its negotiators
278. A constitutional separation of powers analysis is beyond the scope of this Note. See,
e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). But cf. Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
279. Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 193, at 921.
280. Dam, supra note 186, at 891.
281. A majority of the twenty-four members of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OCED) have antitrust laws based upon similar principles as that of the
United States. II W. FUGATE, supra note 251, § 16.1. The OCED includes: Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. n. 1.
282. Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 193, at 917.
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to formulate an agreement acceptable to United States economic and
political objectives.
283
C. Sovereign Compulsion Defense
The sovereign compulsion defense2 84 is an implied defense avail-
able to an antitrust defendant for conduct compelled by a foreign gov-
ernment and occurring within the territory of the foreign sovereign.28 5
The defense, based in comity, 2 6 prevents United States courts from
reviewing the validity of the policies of foreign states and protects the
defendants from being penalized for conduct over which they have no
choice.287 The compelled conduct becomes similar to an act of the
state itself.288 This "market participant" 28 9 antitrust exemption re-
quires that the foreign government must be fundamental to the al-
leged illegal conduct; mere approval or acquiescence is generally
insufficient. 2
90
The sovereign compulsion defense is very important to foreign
governments. In Matsushita, the Japanese consumer electronic com-
283. See K. BREWSTER & J. ATWOOD, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
(2d ed. 1981) §§ 19.05-.07.
284. The corollary of the sovereign compulsion defense is the "act of state" doctrine. The
doctrine is asserted by a foreign government while the sovereign compulsion defense is asserted
by private litigants. It precludes judicial inquiry into the validity of acts by foreign sovereigns.
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). The act of state doctrine recognizes that
sovereign states must respect each other's independence and thus their courts will not hear
judgments on the acts of another state which occur within its own territory. Id.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 note, 1330, 1332, 1392, 1442, 1602-11 (1982)), "pro-
vides that sovereign immunity shall not apply to an action based upon a commercial activity in
the United States by a foreign state ...... II W. FUGATE, supra note 251, § 3.10.
285. See Comment, Foreign Sovereign Compulsion in American Antitrust Law, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 131 (1980).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 233-38.
287. See Mannington Mill, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
288. See, e.g., Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291
(D. Del. 1970).
When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there have no choice but to obey. Acts
of business become effectively acts of the sovereign. The Sherman Act does not con-
fer jurisdiction on United States courts over acts of foreign sovereigns.
Id. at 1298; see also J. TOWNSEND, EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST: THE SHERMAN ACT
AND U.S. BUSINESS ABROAD 82-83 (1980). "Generally, what a foreign sovereign requires
cannot be held illegal, and judicial cognizance is taken of foreign law and policy." Id. at 82.
289. For example, states are exempted from scrutiny under the commerce clause if, in
pursuing a legitimate state goal, they operate as an actor in the free market. Hughes v. Alex-
andria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809-10 (1976); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 336 (1978).
290. Interamerican Refining, 307 F. Supp. at 1293.
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panies asserted that their five-company rule agreement was compelled
by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The defendants
argued that the sovereign compulsion defense immunized their activi-
ties which were compelled by the Japanese government. The validity
of the defense was assumed by the court of appeals in Matsushita,291
despite its very limited application.
292
The Matsushita litigation concerned many foreign governments,
because the court of appeals was not persuaded by the Japanese gov-
ernment's assertions that MITI compelled the agreement. 293 Conse-
quently, the governments of the United States, 294 Australia, Canada,
France, and the United Kingdom 295 filed an amicus curiae brief. The
four foreign governments asserted that:
[i]n an international context the equality of nations demands that
at least the same weight should be given to the statement of a co-
equal, friendly foreign sovereign describing its regulatory actions
and their significance within its own cultural and legal environ-
ment, which often will be unfamiliar to U.S. courts.
296
The countries that submitted amicus curiae briefs supported the
defense of sovereign compulsion. The implied defense was generally
supported because it recognized the sovereignty of foreign govern-
ments. The countries, however, disagreed on the extensiveness of the
defense.
291. The Third Circuit "assume[d], without deciding, that a government-mandated export
cartel arrangement fixing minimum export prices would be outside the ambit of Sec. 1 of the
Sherman Act." In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 315 (3d Cir. 1983); see, e.g., Inter.
Assoc. of Mach. & Aerospace Workers Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F. Supp.
1354, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
292. The sovereign compulsion defense is limited in application because implied defenses
to the antitrust laws are strongly disfavored. See National Gerimedicial Hosp. v. Blue Cross,
452 U.S. 378 (1981). The defense arose from judicial concerns for comity and deference to the
other branches of government in foreign policy matters. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
164 (1895).
As of 1986, only one defendant, in Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo,
Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1291, 1297-98 (D.Del. 1970), has successfully asserted the implied defense
of sovereign compulsion. Brief for the United States; supra note 248, at 16 n. 16.
293. The foreign governments believed that "[t]he most reliable evidence of a foreign sov-
ereign's policy, law, method of operation and intention vis-a-vis particular challenged conduct
is a statement by that sovereign." Brief of the Governments of Australia, Canada, France, and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 7, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (No.
83-2004) [hereinafter Joint Brief].
294. See Brief for the United States, supra note 248.
295. See Joint Brief, supra note 293.
296. Id. at 7.
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1. United States' Proposal
The Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf
of the United States government. The Justice Department supported
a limited implied defense of sovereign compulsion derived from two
general considerations: comity and separation of powers. 297  The
United States, however, argued that the defense should be narrowly
construed and applied. The Justice Department proposal requires
that the anti-competitive "conduct at issue was in fact compelled by a
foreign sovereign[ ]" because these cases are "likely to touch most
sharply on foreign concerns and pose the greatest difficulties for the
conduct of [United States] foreign relations.
298
The Department of Justice proposed that an antitrust defendant
be required to provide a statement from the foreign government dem-
onstrating that the activity was compelled. 299 A "clear and intelligi-
ble" statement from a foreign government "generally should be
deemed 'conclusive.' 300 The brief required that statements not
meeting this evidentiary requirement should be evaluated by the court
to determine their reliability after considering the credibility of the
statement and circumstances of the case.
30 1
The Justice Department argued that the sovereign compulsion
defense should not apply in antitrust suits initiated by the United
States government because "[a] decision to bring suit thus amounts to
a determination by the executive branch that the challenged conduct
is more harmful to the United States than is any potential injury to
our foreign relationships that will follow from the antitrust action.
30 2
Concerns of comity and foreign relations are already considered by
the executive branch before suit is brought by the United States gov-
ernment, and therefore should be deferred to by the judiciary.
30 3
297. Brief for the United States, supra note 248, at 7. The Justice Department argued that
"'comity among nations and among the respective branches of the Federal Government'...
has led to the creation of the act of state doctrine as a principle of judicial abstention in resolv-
ing disputes concerning the validity of foreign sovereign acts." Id. at 17 (citations omitted).
298. Id. at 20.
299. Id. at 22-23.
300. Id. at 23. "[Iln extraordinary circumstances, concern for the integrity of the judicial
process may obligate a court to inquire into the underlying circumstances if it believes that it
has been presented with a state that is incredible on its face." Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. For example, prior to filing suit the executive branch may "deem it more appropriate
to engage in diplomatic efforts to persuade the foreign sovereign to cease compelling the con-
duct (or to take no action at all) rather than to bring suit." Id. at n. 23.
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Consequently, the sovereign compulsion defense would be available
only in antitrust litigation brought by private parties.
2. Joint Proposal of Australia, Canada, France, and the United
Kingdom
The governments of Australia, Canada, France, and the United
Kingdom filed a joint amicus curiae brief.3°4 The refusal of the court
of appeals to give dispositive weight to or even acknowledge the Japa-
nese government's statement greatly concerned the foreign sover-
eigns. 30 5 The brief expressed "a compelling interest in the treatment
that is accorded their official statements made to U.S. courts. '
306
The four governments proposed a broad defense which they be-
lieved fully recognized their right to exercise territorial sovereignty
without being reviewed by foreign courts.
30 7
The foreign governments also asserted that their statements sub-
mitted to United States courts should be accepted as the most reliable
evidence available on their laws, policy, and intent. 30 8 They also ar-
gued that comity required United States courts to grant such state-
ments "at least the same weight" given in foreign courts. 309  The
amici maintained that United States courts cannot adjudicate the ve-
304. See Joint Brief, supra note 293. The joint brief only discussed the foreign compulsion
defense and expressed no opinion regarding the alleged antitrust violations. Id.
305. The four governments believed that the court of appeals disregard of the statement
from the government of Japan threatened:
[t]rade and investment between the United States and the amici [which] are tradi-
tionally and necessar[il]y conducted on the basis of mutual respect for each nation's
sovereignty .... One of the fundamental attributes of each nation's sovereignty is
the right to control conduct within its borders in the manner it deems appropriate,
subject only to such limitations as may be agreed between governments or otherwise
required by international law.
Id. at 2.
306. Id. at 5. The foreign governments cited Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980),
and other cases where a United States court found a foreign sovereign's statement unsatisfac-
tory. Id. at 5 & n.8.
307. Id. at 6. The governments asserted that the sovereign compulsion defense is based
on:
international comity, judicial noninterference in the Executive Branch's conduct of
international relations, fairness to private parties caught between conflicting sover-
eign commands, the construction of the Sherman Act, and the concept that conduct
compelled by a foreign sovereign should be deemed an act of the sovereign itself.
Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted). The countries also urged the Supreme Court to "reaffirm the
foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine's vitality . . ." as early as possible to avoid possibly
disrupting the international economic relations. Id. at 7, 18.
308. Id. at 7.
309. Id.
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racity of foreign government statements without questioning the gov-
ernment's sovereignty.
310
The joint brief did not mandate express compulsion on the part
of their governments. Requiring express compulsion would entail
United States courts mandating administrative procedures to foreign
governments. 31' Additionally, requiring proof of explicit government
compulsion disregards the economies of countries which lack cen-
trally planned and highly regulated economies.31 2 Therefore, the gov-
ernments argued that "the express determinative inquiry for a U.S.
court is whether the foreign sovereign exercised its authority to man-
date the relevant conduct. ' 31 3 The form of the government order, ex-
pressed or implied, may reflect not the importance of the issue
domestically, but the style of governing. 314 Thus, the amici con-
cluded, "[flriendly foreign governments should not have their na-
tional policies questioned or thwarted by American courts because
they do not adopt compulsory foreign orders. '3
1 5
The Supreme Court in Matsushita failed to address the sovereign
compulsion defense issue. Justice White in his dissent, stated that the
Court's "decision makes it unnecessary to reach the sovereign com-
pulsion issue."' 316 The reluctance of the Court to discuss the issue is
unclear. After Matsushita, "[t]he vitality and intricacies of the for-
eign compulsion defense remain disputed uncharted territory... [be-
cause] the [C]ourt has carefully avoided giving any hint of its
position."
317
The availability of the sovereign compulsion defense to the de-
fendants in Matsushita is dependent on the application of either the
310. Id. at 9-10. The governments analogized the sovereign compulsion defense with the
act of state doctrine, based upon the principle that:
[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign
State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the gov-
ernment of another, done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason
of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
Id. at 8.
311. Joint Brief, supra note 293, at 10.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 10.
316. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598 (1986). "We
reverse on the first issue [antitrust liability], but do not reach the second [sovereign compulsion
defense]." Id. at 582.
317. Griffin, Court Ducks Foreign Antitrust Questions, NAT'L L. J., Vol. 8 No. 48, at S-11,
col. 2.
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United States or the foreign nations proposal. Under the Justice De-
partment's narrower implementation, the defendants could not assert
the defense. MITI's statement did not clearly indicate that it com-
pelled the price and distribution agreements. The court of appeals
found that the Japanese government may have impliedly authorized
the agreements, but did not compel them. 318 The evidence also indi-
cated that the defendants actually tried to conceal their agreements
from the Japanese government.319 Consequently, the sovereign com-
pulsion defense would be unavailable to the defendants because
MITI's statement did not expressly claim, nor did the circumstances
indicate, that the agreements were compelled by the government.
320
Although it is not clear from the Court's decision, the defendants
may not have been able to assert the defense under the joint country
proposal. MITI's statement did not clearly indicate it mandated the
agreements. Additionally, the circumstances indicated that the de-
fendants acted under an "umbrella" of the Japanese government, but
were not acting in response to any government compulsion.
321
The amicus curiae briefs reflect the concerns and policy decisions
of both the United States and several important trading partners.
These factors will necessarily be weighted by courts in any future con-
sideration of the sovereign compulsion defense.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sherman Antitrust Act was enacted during a period of vig-
orous domestic reform. It reflected the growing concerns in the
United States about the abusive power exercised by domestic corpora-
tions and trusts. Issues of foreign relations, trade, or comity were not
considered important factors during this period.
Although the express language of the Sherman Act has changed
very little since originally enacted, the United States economy has
transformed dramatically into an interdependent trading nation. The
growing importance of foreign trade to the economic welfare of the
United States requires that a clear antitrust standard be enunciated.
The days of isolationism, which allowed United States courts to avoid
applying antitrust law to conduct occurring abroad, are now gone.
318. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 315 (3d Cir. 1983).
319. Id.
320. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598 (1986)
("The sovereign compulsion question that both petitioners and the Solicitor General urge us to
decide thus is not present here.").
321. In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d at 315.
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Unfortunately, it is unclear whether future courts must limit
their analysis to foreseeable and intended effects of extraterritorial
conduct or whether they must consider the competing social, polit-
ical, economic, and legal consequences of the affected nations. Addi-
tionally, the court may have to determine foreign policy objectives of
the executive branch to ensure that its decision is consistent.
The Supreme Court in Matsushita raised many doubts as to the
future of the widely used jurisdictional rule of reason by relying on
the simpler intended effects test. The discussion of the test was not
crucial to the outcome of the case, and thus may not indicate the true
position of the Court. Additionally, the Supreme Court did not con-
sider the scope of the sovereign compulsion decisions despite its im-
portance to many foreign governments. International trade and
diplomatic harmony require that limits be placed on the ability of pri-
vate litigants to invoke the jurisdiction of United States courts to ad-
judicate the veracity and wisdom of the economic policy of a foreign
government.
The solution for extraterritorial problems may require an inter-
national convention to fully address international norms of economic
regulation. The principle of prudence standard provides the govern-
ment an alternative to the regular effects or reason tests. Political and
diplomatic solutions may provide an interim method to allow courts
to function with manageable standards and still consider possible im-
plications for United States foreign relations.
The competing proposals, for extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Antitrust Act and the availability of the sovereign compul-
sion defense, provide an interim solution in an area crucial to United
States interests. Thus, many still await an answer-from either the
Supreme Court or Congress-about the future jurisdictional applica-
tion of United States antitrust laws and defenses.
Geoffrey T Tong*
* This Note is dedicated to my parents Tom and Mae Tong; their love, support and
guidance have made so many dreams a reality.
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